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Corporate internationalization has altered the corporate landscape irreversibly.
Specifically, international trading in securities and cross-border corporate owner-
ship, directorship, and management have increased substantially.' In 1995 multi-
national companies invested a record $315 billion outside their own national
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1. See generally Richard M. Klapow, Foreign Investment Company Law in the United States:
The Need for Change in a Global Securities Market, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 411 (1988) (citing OECD
REPORT, THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: SECURITIES
(Paris, 1987)); Caroline A.A. Greene, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Advances
in Assistance and Cooperation, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635 (1994); Arthur R. Pinto, The
Internationalization of the Hostile Takeover Market: Its Implications for Choice of Law in Corporate
and Securities Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 55 (1990). This trend to expand corporate activities
internationally is driven by the benefits of risk diversification, the enhanced profitability that interna-
tional investment frequently offers, and technological improvements and reductions in regulatory
constraints. Klapow, supra, at 411.
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borders; the United States, a massive $96 billion.2 One-third of the one hundred
largest multinational companies, ranked by foreign assets, are U.S. companies.3
Additionally, U.S. investors increasingly look to Eastern Europe and developing
countries for new investment opportunities.4 Furthermore, American companies,
via joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises on the Chinese mainland,
have directly invested more than $15 billion into China over the past six years. 5
After more than four decades, Eastern European countries have enacted or
reenacted corporate and commercial codes. 6 These laws closely follow American
and Western European corporate governance models.7 Similarly, Chinese laws
increasingly reflect U.S. corporate law standards.8 Drafters of the sections of
the Russian Civil Code that regulate companies have consciously borrowed ele-
ments from the United States' past. 9 Thus, as the world's securities markets
systematically are interwoven, the hues of Delaware law increasingly become
visible in foreign laws.
With internationalized corporate securities markets in place and with other
countries increasingly looking to the United States in formulating their corporate
fiduciary standards, the standard of care the Delaware Supreme Court dictates
affects Delaware interests in a variety of ways. For example, it affects Delaware
interests through the application, in a litigation setting, of Delaware substantive
fiduciary law to a foreign corporation, or to a Delaware corporation doing business
abroad. Delaware law can apply in a U.S. federal or state court, in a foreign
court applying Delaware law through choice of law analysis, or in an arbitration
or mediation proceeding where substantive Delaware law controls. Furthermore,
if a court's or tribunal's choice of law principles lead it to apply a foreign jurisdic-
tion's laws, and those laws reflect "Delaware fiduciary principles," Delaware
fiduciary standards could affect Delaware interests.' ° Additionally, Delaware
2. Fred R. Breakley, Foreign Investment by Multinationals Grew 40% in 1995, Lifted by Merg-
ers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1996, at A2 (citing United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Report). The 40% growth in foreign direct investment, more than twice the rate of world export
growth, is, in part, attributable to "[cross-border acquisitions in the pharmaceutical, telecommunica-
tions, financial-services and entertainment industries," as well as "competitive pressures, new techno-
logies, privatizations of country-owned enterprises and more of an open-door policy toward invest-
ments by many countries." Id.
3. Id.
4. Vassil Breskovski, Directors' Duty of Care in Eastern Europe, 29 INT'L LAW. 77 (1995).
5. Note, Chinese Characteristics in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's
Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1995).
6. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 78. State-owned businesses are being transformed into public
limited companies as privatization increases in Eastern and Central Europe. Id. at 77.
7. Id. at 78.
8. See infra parts II.A., II.E.
9. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1912, 1930 (1996).
10. Delaware's interests at stake often are not visible at first glance. A Delaware citizen with
funds in a Delaware-based mutual fund investing in Bulgaria may have an interest in both Bulgaria's
and Delaware's fiduciary laws because Bulgarian fiduciary law may reflect Delaware fiduciary princi-
ples. See infra parts II, III. Should the Delaware investor choose to file a class action arising from
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fiduciary standards affect Delaware interests when Delaware investors, in part,
choose the country where they will invest based on the corporate fiduciary law
protection that country affords shareholders, and where that country's fiduciary
law, to some extent, is based on Delaware corporate fiduciary standards.
Delaware corporate fiduciary law, however, reflects neither the globalization
of securities markets, nor the impact such globalization has on Delaware citizens. "
Intended to counteract director inattentivenes and inactivity, Delaware's standard
of care derives from established notions of trust law and agency law. 12 Closely
tied to duties of loyalty and candor, the Delaware duty of care is, in essence,
an ordinary prudent director standard.' 3 However, the Delaware duty of care
balances against the business judgment rule's principles of judicial deference.
In carving directors' duty of care from the protective shield of the business
judgment rule, the Delaware Supreme Court has left the demarcating lines blurred.
Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court has been criticized, in part, for
contributing to Delaware's somewhat uncertain and wavering standard of care. 
14
Moreover, the duty of care has, in practice, very little effect on corporate gover-
nance.1 5 While the Delaware Supreme Court offered cautious guidance in its
1985 Smith v. Van Gorkum 6 and its Cede I, II, and III decisions, 7 the Delaware
duty of care remains largely ineffective. In this regard, little commentary has
focused on the formulation of Delaware's director standard of care in light of
internationalized securities markets and how emerging economies look to the
United States for guidance in formulating standards of care.
This Comment addresses these concerns as follows. Since comparative analysis
of corporate fiduciary law is sketched against the backdrop of conflict of laws
issues, Part I briefly outlines the distinctions between procedural and substantive
law and overviews the corporation law that might apply to international corpora-
tions. Part II offers a comparative analysis of corporate fiduciary duties (in particu-
lar, the duty of care) in various countries. First, it analyzes Delaware fiduciary law
the Bulgarian corporate directors' breach of fiduciary duties as stipulated in Bulgarian law, the
Delaware citizen's rights and remedies will be closely linked to the standard of care both Bulgaria
and Delaware set forth for corporate directors. Id.
11. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,
509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
12. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment
Rule, 19 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 971, 973 (1994).
13. Id. at 985 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 977-80.
16. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
17. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (Cede ); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Cede 11); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663
A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (Cede 111).
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and traces the business judgment rule, its origins, development, and underlying
justifications. It then tracks the duty of care as a corporate fiduciary obligation
in Delaware since it was first recognized by a Delaware court. Part II also offers
a comparative analysis of the standard of care directors owe to shareholders or
corporations in various countries. This country-by-country fiduciary overview
provides a rough basis for assessing risk in international investment activities;
in negotiating cross-border joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions; and in
choosing remedial actions following international corporate fall-outs. In addition,
it benchmarks Delaware's standard of care relative to various other legal systems.
The Comment assesses the fiduciary duties corporate directors owe to sharehold-
ers and the corporation in Western Europe (the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France), Japan, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Republic
of Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland), the People's Republic of China, and Canada.
In Part Il, this Comment argues that the Delaware Supreme Court should
reassess the standard of care directors owe to a corporation in light of the interna-
tionalization of corporation and securities markets.
I. What Law Will Apply?
A threshold question this Comment addresses is: How will a court decide what
law governs the standard of care corporate directors owe to their corporation?
More specifically, how will the standard of care set forth in the Delaware Supreme
Court come to be applied in a particular forum?
A. PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The law of the forum in common law jurisdictions commonly controls proce-
dural questions while choice-of-law rules select the proper law that serves as the
rule of decision for substantive questions.' 8 Therefore, the first step in selecting
the law to apply is to characterize the issue as substantive or procedural. Within
the U.S. federal court system, an issue often must receive such a characterization
at least twice. 19 First, a court must decide whether it even needs to consider
applying law other than its own.20 Second, a court must, if the primary rule of
18. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 214
(1988). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971), and intro, note
to ch. 12 (1971). "Conflict of laws" deals with when and why a certain jurisdiction's courts consider
another jurisdiction's prior determination in a case pending before the former jurisdiction's courts.
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFUCT OF LAWS 1 (1982). The term "conflict of laws," also
referred to as "private international law," is primarily used in the United States, Canada, and
England. Id. Relating to issues between individuals, conflicts laws do not flow from an international
consensus, such as "customary (public) international law." Id. Furthermore, two jurisdictions'
substantive rules of decision "conflict" when circumstances seem to justify the application of either
state's rule. Id. at 2. Because conflicts rules are purely domestic in nature, foreign rules will impact
the transaction if the domestic conflicts rules point to foreign law. Id.
19. DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 214.
20. Id. (citing A. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN CONFLICTS OF LAW 135-37 (1940)).
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decision refers to some other law, choose the law that will ultimately be used
to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties.2 The double operation
of these concepts results from the use of different concepts of substance and
procedure for different purposes.22 In this vein, "procedure" means nothing
more than rules not intended to operate outside the court that created the rules,
and "substance" means only a rule that is not "procedural." 23 Therefore, the
standard of care corporate directors owe to shareholders probably is "substan-
tive" because it commonly is intended to operate outside the court that created
it.
B. CORPORATION LAW IN CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS
Parties to a lawsuit or proceeding can choose the law they wish to govern
the dispute resolution.24 Nonetheless, corporate directors' fiduciary duties are
governed by what broadly can be termed "corporation law." 25 Under both English
law26 and American law, 27 a company's existence, dissolution, and internal affairs
are governed by the law of incorporation.2 8 For corporation law and therefore
corporate fiduciary duties to apply, an entity first must be legally classified as
a corporation.2 9
Absent a valid choice of law by the parties to the suit, legal systems use different
21. Id. For a comprehensive illustration, consider cases under the Erie doctrine such as In re
Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
22. In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944,
948 (Cal. 1953); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); see also Peter
Western & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity? 78 MIcH. L.
RaV. 311, 361-63 (1980); John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693
(1974). "Procedural" rules relate to functioning of courts themselves; in contrast, "substantive"
rules address primary conduct or conduct in nonjudicial contexts. DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at
214; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a (1971). A court or tribunal may determine, in interpret-
ing a statute or precedent, that the law is either substantive, procedural, or both; therefore, no single
test is suitable for all choice-of-law purposes. DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 215.
23. Thus, a judge could justify virtually any particular outcome even if not consciously engaged
in such a decision-making process. DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 414-67.
24. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ch. 2 (1984); UCC § 5-108 (1996); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, at 188 (1971); Peter Winship, Formation of International Sales Contracts
Under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17 INT'L LAW. 1 (1983); P. NORTH, CONTRACT CONFLICTS V,
12, 299 (1982) (discussing choice of law under the EU Convention).
25. See, e.g., Kademian v. Ladish, 792 F.2d 614, 628 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. 2 J.H.C. MoRsIS ET AL., THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 725-31 (10th ed. 1980).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 279 (1971).
28. Corporate "nationality" also depends on the place of incorporation. See, e.g., Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 183 n.8 (1982).
29. While numerous theories discuss corporations' characteristics, all agree that corporations
have group interests distinguishable from the individual interests of its individual members. HARRY
G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1983). Under the federal tax
code, corporations include associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies. I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(3) (1996).
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factors to determine the law applicable to corporations. 30 For example, early
French literature suggested that the law of the place "d'exploitation," the place
where the corporation has the center of its commercial activity, was the proper
choice.3" This principle is analogous to the American concept of a corporation's
principal place of business. French case law increasingly rejected the reference
to the law of the place of principal commercial activity and instead adopted the
reference to the corporation's "sige social" or seat.32 This rule has been accepted
in continental Europe, except in the Netherlands. 3 The "seat" of a corporation
is where most of its administration or management is located or takes place. The
civil law, however, does not share this logic. Civilians hold that just as "an
individual's center of existence is where he lives, a legal entity's center of exis-
tence is where its commercial activity is carried on."
3 4
Thus, in a civil law country, if absent a valid choice of law clause a corporation
is found to have its "seat" or "principal place of business" in a certain jurisdic-
tion, that jurisdiction's laws will apply and a Delaware shareholder's interests
will be decided by that jurisdiction's laws. However, in both the United States
and England, the law of the place of incorporation controls.
II. Fiduciary Duties
This part considers fiduciary duties in the United States (Delaware), Western
Europe35 (specifically the United Kingdom, Germany, and France), Japan, East-
ern Europe (specifically Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slo-
vakia, Hungary, and Poland), the People's Republic of China, and Canada. The
State of Delaware was selected as representative of U.S. fiduciary law.36
30. Courts must work within one of three different choice-of-law traditions just within the United
States. DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 228. These are: a rule-centered "vested rights" approach,
aimed at coordinating competing sovereignties; a methodology-centered "interest analysis" aimed
at coordinating social policies; and a new rule-centered "neoterritorialist" approach, aimed at coordi-
nating the parties' expectations. Id. The vested rights system, found in the First Restatement of
Conflicts, allows courts first to characterize the nature of the suit and then select the jurisdiction
under whose law rights of that type "vest"-for example, for torts, the place where the injury
occurred. Id.
31. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 18, at 884.
32. Id. (citing BATTIFOL & LAGARDE, 1 DROIT INTERNATIONAL Ppivt No. 193, 230 (7th ed.
1981)).
33. Eric Stein, Conflict-of-Law Rules by Treaty: Recognition of Companies in a Regional Market,
68 MICH. L. REV. 1327, 1330-31 (1970).
34. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT LAW 503 (3d ed. 1977) (citing KEGAL, INTERNA-
TIONALES PRIVATRECHT 263 (4th ed. 1977)).
35. This Comment discusses Western European standards of care not to show how United States
fiduciary principles shaped Western European standards of care, but rather to place the Delaware
standard of care in a Western jurisprudential context.
36. Not only are more than half of the 500 largest industrial firms in the United States incorporated
in Delaware, but Delaware's corporation law also serves as an innovator and model for other jurisdic-
tions. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 888, 889-90 (1990).
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37Fiduciary duties are born out of the equitable principles of trust and agency.
Fiduciary duties protect the fiduciary relationship against wrongful administration
by forbidding disloyalty. 38 However, while the roots and principles of fiduciary
law are fairly well established, its exact scope and application in Delaware remain
unclear. Therefore, before assessing non-U.S. fiduciary principles and before
commenting on the need for Delaware to consider international developments
in reassessing its standard of care, this Comment first analyzes Delaware's past
and present fiduciary corporate standard of care.
A. DELAWARE
Within the United States, fiduciary law is state law. 39 In Delaware, the funda-
mental relationship between a director and the corporation that he or she serves
is the fiduciary relationship. 40 Section 141(e) of Delaware's Corporations Code
in part codifies a director's fiduciary standard of care.4 It allows directors, in
exercising their duty of care, to rely on certain materials and information:
A member of the board of directors . . . shall, in the performance of his duties, be
fully protected in relying in good faith upon ... such information ... presented to
the corporation by ... any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes
are within such other person's professional or expert competence and who has been
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.42
Drawing upon notions of trust law, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that
the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business
and affairs of a corporation and owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders. 43 Thus, directors are guardians of the sharehold-
37. Robert B. Robbins, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Corporate General Partners to Limited
Partnerships, CA65 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 87 (1996) (citing G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 543 (rev.
2d ed. 1978)).
38. A trustee has a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary of a trust to administer
the trust "solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Id. at 89. Moreover,
[t]he trustee must exclude all self-interest, as well as the interest of a third party, in
his administration of the trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiary. The trustee
must not place himself in a position where his own interests or that of another enters
into conflict, or may possibly conflict, with the interest of the trust or its beneficiary.
Id.
39. Klapow, supra note 1, at 411.
40. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1996).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986).
The Delaware Supreme Court drew from what it established in 1939 as a bedrock principle of
Delaware corporation law:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand
in afiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders.. . .This rule, inveterate
and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury
or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing all
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ers' property and, therefore, assume special duties and responsibilities by virtue
of this relationship. Moreover, American corporate law establishes that the pri-
mary, if not the sole, responsibility of corporate directors goes to the shareholder
owners." However, although directors' duties are frequently analogized to those
of trustees, the nature of directors' duties are tempered in corporation law by
the "business judgment rule' '-judicial deference to board actions and decisions
that fall within the sphere of the board's business judgment. Consequently, absent
a showing of culpability, directors or controlling shareholders do not have to
sacrifice their own financial interests in an enterprise for the sake of the corpora-
tion or its minority shareholders.45
1. The Business Judgment Rule
The Delaware Supreme Court in 1984 described the business judgment rule
as follows:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment
will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to
establish facts rebutting the presumption. 46
While the presumption component of the business judgment rule procedurally
places the burden on the challenging party, the origins of the rule probably relate
temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence
imposed by fiduciary relation.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (emphasis added; quoting
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
44. Roger S. Aaron, Directors'Duties in Corporate Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions, 878
PRAC. L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 289, 295 (quoting Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)).
45. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986). In Jedwab, a preferred
shareholder brought a class action on behalf of all owners of preferred stock other than the controlling
shareholder and the related corporation. Id. The defendants argued that there is no broad duty of
fidelity owed to preferred stock if that duty is understood to extend beyond the specific contractual
terms defining the special rights, preferences, or limitations of the preferred stockholders. Id. More
specifically, defendants argued from the rule that "preferential rights are contractual in nature and
therefore are governed by the express provisions of a company's certificate of incorporation." Id.
at 593. The court, however, concluded that:
with respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred
stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its directors is essentially contrac-
tual and the scope of the duty is appropriately defined by reference to the specific
words evidencing that contract; where however the right asserted is not to a preference
as against the common stock but rather a right shared equally with the common, the
existence of such right and the scope of the correlative duty may be measured by
equitable as well as legal standards.
Id. at 594.
46. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
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back to its substantive context.47 The rule dates to nineteenth and early twentieth
century cases that were based on concepts ofjudgment, risk, and discretion rather
than on a "procedural presumption." 4' However, by the early twentieth century,
Delaware had established a procedural interpretation of the rule. Indeed, by 1924,
Delaware described the business judgment rule as follows:
[D]irectors of [a] corporation are clothed with that presumption which the law accords
to them. . . . [T]he sale in question must be examined with the presumption in its favor
that the directors who negotiated it honestly believed that they were securing terms
and conditions which were expedient and for the corporation's best interests. 9
The business judgment rule is grounded in the essential nature of the corporate
form5°-while directors possess the expertise and experience to manage a corpora-
tion, shareholders passively invest capital into the corporation. Therefore, an
agency relationship exists between directors and shareholders.51 Notwithstanding
that directors and shareholders have certain incentives to see a company prosper,
their interests also at times diverge. Specifically, certain directors might attempt
to "appropriate perquisites" for personal use out of a company's resources. 2
In response, shareholders might choose to monitor director behavior by actually
observing directors and demanding detailed performance reports,53 bargain ex
ante with directors over a range of possible contingencies, 54 or, perhaps most
efficiently, allow directors to operate within the purview of the business judgment
rule and fiduciary obligations.
Therefore, the business judgment rule is a judicial response to the need to
balance the fiduciary standards imposed on directors when exercising their mana-
gerial responsibilities in practical real-world decision making.55 The rule creates
an environment in which capable people are willing to serve as decision makers
47. Jay P. Morgan, Business Judgment Rule or Relic?: Cede v. Technicolor and the Continuing
Metamorphosis of Director Duty of Care, 45 EMORY L.J. 339, 353 (1996); see also R. Franklin
Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule: Symposium on Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337, 1342 (1993).
48. Morgan, supra note 47, at 353.
49. Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924); see also Cole
v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931).
50. See generally Morgan, supra note 47, at 342.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 342. The opportunities for corporate corruption may be greater in developing than in
developed countries. See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 1911, 1961 ("[t]he risk of
looting is far higher in emerging than in developed markets"); John Hogarth, Bribery of Official
in Pursuit of Corporate Aims, 6 CRiM. L. FORUM 557 (1995) (noting corruption in developing countries
such as Russia).
53. American shareholders investing in a foreign corporation are not only geographically removed
from the corporation's headquarters, but also face language and foreign regulatory barriers in monitor-
ing foreign directors.
54. Likewise, American shareholders cannot easily bargain with foreign directors.
55. Aaron, supra note 44, at 303 (1995). As one court stated:
Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, informa-
tion and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there is great social
utility in encouraging the allocation of assets and the evaluation and assumption of
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without the constant risk of judicial second-guessing and personal liability expo-
sure. 
56
The business judgment rule also is based upon the principle that shareholders,
with financial information available in the corporate marketplace, voluntarily
invest in corporate stocks notwithstanding the risks involved.57 Indeed, sharehold-
ers, unlike directors, can diversify their investments to reduce risk.5 8 If directors
are subject to strict standards of judicial review, they may become overcautious
in decision making and, consequently, forgo favorable risks.5 9 Furthermore, it
is impracticable to determine ex post facto the quality of business decisions, other
than through a rule of general judicial deference. 60 Consequently, the business
judgment rule places the burden on the party challenging the decision to establish
that the judgment of a board was an abuse of discretion.6'
Business judgment judicial review encompasses three elements: a review of
the objective financial interests of the board under scrutiny (i.e., independence); 61
a review of the board's subjective motivation (i.e., good faith); 63 and an objective
review of the decision-making process (i.e., due care). 64
If the board is financially interested, or breaches its duties of care or good
faith, it bears the burden to establish the entire fairness of the transaction. A
director can satisfy the good faith and due care elements if the plaintiff cannot
show a prima facie case of bad faith or gross negligence, or if the balance of
the evidence does not establish bad faith or gross negligence, even if a prima
facie case is made Out.
6 5
Thus, while directors initially are given the benefit of the doubt that they have
acted honestly and with reasonable care, a breach of the duties of care or loyalty
could rebut this presumption. 66 Then, directors must prove the intrinsic or entire
fairness of the challenged conduct. 67 If they fail to do so, directors are personally
economic risk by those with such skill and information, courts have long been reluctant
to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been made in good faith.
West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988).
56. Aaron, supra note 44, at 303.
57. Morgan, supra note 47, at 349.
58. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
59. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 96-97 (1993).
60. See Morgan, supra note 47, at 352.
61. Aaron, supra note 44, at 66.
62. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, [1988-1989] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,194, at 91,709-10 (Del. Ch. 1989).
63. Id.
64. Id. However, the duty of care is seldom used to overcome the business judgment rule. See
Horsey, supra note 12, at 977.
65. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc., [1988-1989] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,709-10.
66. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
67. Aaron, supra note 44, at 66-67. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount Com-
munication, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993), stipulated that the key features
of an enhanced scrutiny, the degree of scrutiny applied during entire fairness review, are as follows:
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liable to the corporation or its shareholders for damages proximately caused by
such conduct.6"
2. The Delaware Duty of Care
Very rarely have shareholders successfully used directors' fiduciary duties of
care to overcome the business judgment rule.69 While "in the abstract, the duty
of care seems to impose a meaningful obligation on directors and officers," in
practice the duty of care "has had almost no effect on corporate governance." 7 0
Thus, in applying the business judgment rule, courts presuppose "thatjudgment-
reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised." 7 However, some commenta-
tors argue that to invoke the business judgment rule in the first instance, "the
director must exercise his judgment within the scope of the duty of care-that
is, his judgment must have been reasonable and exercised with the care of an
ordinarily prudent person." '72
While Delaware is famous for its sophisticated and developed corporate case
law, Delaware courts have only sparsely articulated a director's duty of care.73
Not until 1963, in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. ,'4 did Delaware
espouse a substantial body of case law75 imposing on a fiduciary director the
a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision-making process employed by the
directors, including the information on which the directors based their decision; and ajudicial examina-
tion of the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing. Id. at
45. The Paramount court noted that "[a]lthough an enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the
reasonableness of the substantive merits of a board's actions, a court should not ignore the complexity
of the directors' task in a sale of control." Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded that "a court
applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable
decision, not a perfect decision." Id.
68. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
69. See Horsey, supra note 12, at 977-80; Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director's Standard
of Care: Past, Present, andFuture, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505 (1985) (noting that the business judgment
rule historically proved to be a very potent defense for corporate directors against shareholder claims
for loss resulting from decisions that went awry); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty
of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62
TEX. L. REV. 591, 593 (1983) (finding judicial reluctance to apply diligence standards against well-
intentioned, non-self-dealing directors); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks:
New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099
(1968) (finding only four cases of derivative litigation in which disinterested directors breached
fiduciary duty of care).
70. George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and
the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 644-45 (1981).
71. Chittur, supra note 69, at 505 n.2 (quoting Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y.
1944)).
72. Dent, supra note 70, at 647.
73. Horsey, supra note 12, at 981.
74. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
75. See, eg., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883
(6th Cir. 1938).
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duty to act in an informed manner and with the care of a prudent person.76 In
Graham, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded:
[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circum-
stances. Their duties are those of control, and whether or not by neglect they have made
themselves liable for failure to exercise proper control depends on the circumstances and
facts ... "
While Graham broke new ground in corporate law by recognizing a director's
fiduciary duty of care, "the accomplishment was diminished by the tentative and
almost begrudging manner in which the court embraced this new-found duty."78
However, in 1971 the Delaware Supreme Court, in Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,
found an enforceable duty of care component in the business judgment rule.
Finding the defendant directors in breach of their duty of care, the court held
that the business judgment rule's application "of necessity depends upon a show-
ing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment authorizing
the transaction under review." 80 The court concluded that absent evidence that
"director judgment was [not] brought to bear with specificity on the transac-
tions," the business judgment rule does not apply."s
Drawing upon Kaplan2 and the dicta of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.,S3 the Delaware Supreme Court, in Aronson v. Lewis,8 repositioned a director's
standard of care in relation to the business judgment rule. The court stated:
[T]o invoke the rule's protection directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to
making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.
Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge
76. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130; see also Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 132 A. 442,
447 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff'd, 140 A. 264 (Del. 1927) (first Delaware decision enunciating directors'
duty to refrain from profiting themselves at expense of their beneficiaries and to save their beneficiaries
from loss); Cole v. Nat'l Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931) (earliest Delaware decision
holding that grossly imprudent conduct of otherwise disinterested directors is not protected by business
judgment rule).
77. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. Graham is believed to represent the first explicit recognition
by a Delaware court of directors' duty of care as well as of good faith and loyalty. Horsey, supra
note 12, at 986-87.
78. Horsey, supra note 12, at 988. While numerous state legislatures enacted statutes defining
a director's fiduciary standard of care, Delaware, by contrast, left this responsibility to the courts.
Id. Delaware courts, however, did not refine the disinterested director's duty of care parameters.
See, e.g., Meyerson v. El Paso, 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967) (extending business judgment rule
to all conduct absent gross and palpable overreaching); Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971) (extending business judgment rule to any rational business purpose).
79. 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971).
80. Id. at 124.
81. Id.; see also Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (holding
director in breach of duty of care upon a finding of gross negligence); Gimbel v. Signal Companies,
316 A.2d 599, 610 (Del. Ch. 1972), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (holding director duty of care
distinct from, and not merely surrogate of, duty of loyalty).
82. 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971).
83. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
84. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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of their duties. While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable
standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.
85
In 1985, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, s6 the Delaware Supreme Court refined (or
some would argue "redefined") a director's standard of care in light of the
business judgment rule. In a controversial opinion, 87 the court found the directors
of Trans Union Corporation liable for failing to exercise care during the corpora-
tion's merger negotiations.88 The court applied a gross negligence standard and
held that the Trans Union directors were uninformed and, consequently, did not
satisfy their duty of care to ensure business judgment rule protection.8 9 The court
stated:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role
... in establishing the . . .purchase price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic
value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances ... were grossly negligent
in approving the "sale" of the Company upon two hours' consideration, without prior
notice, and without the exigency of a crisis .... 90
Rather than substitute its own judgment for that of the board, the court reviewed
the process by which the board reached the decision and noted the board's lack
of preparation and deliberation. 9' Notwithstanding the court's firm duty-of-care
language, the opinion has been rationalized as based on "exceptional facts." 92
Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court refined the duty of care in separate
opinions all involving the same case, namely Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 93
Cede involved a cash-out merger where the dissenting shareholders sued the
directors for, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty. In 1993, in the
second appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court (Cede i), 94 the court held that
Delaware had never put forth, for purposes of rebutting the business judgment
85. Id. at 812.
86. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
87. See, e.g., R. Link Newcomb, The Limitation ofDirectors'Liability: AProposalforLegislative
Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 419 (1987). Shortly after Van Gorkom, Delaware enacted a statute
that provides, in part, that a Delaware corporation's articles may contain:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of a fiduciary duty as a director,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders;
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct
or a knowing violation of law. ...
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1995).
88. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
89. Id. at 893.
90. Id. at 874.
91. Id. at 874-80.
92. See, e.g., Newcomb, supra note 87, at 419.
93. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (Cede 1); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Cede 11); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663
A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (Cede III).
94. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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rule, a requirement that the plaintiffs prove not only a breach of duty of care,
but also the underlying injury.95 Finding that the plaintiffs successfully rebutted
the business judgment rule, the court stated:
To inject a requirement of proof of injury into the [business judgment] rule's formulation
for burden shifting purposes is to lose sight of the underlying purpose of the rule.
Burden shifting does not create per se liability on the part of the directors; rather, it
is a procedure by which Delaware courts of equity determine under what standard of
review director liability is to be judged. To require proof of injury as a component of
the proof necessary to rebut the business judgment presumption would be to convert
the burden shifting process from a threshold determination of the appropriate standard
of review to a dispositive adjudication on the merits. 96
Therefore, it took the Delaware Supreme Court no less than three decades, since
it first recognized a director's duty of care in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. ,97 to resolve that injury is not needed to rebut successfully the business
judgment rule's presumption.98
In 1995 the Cede III court affirmed the Chancery Court's subsequent finding
of entire fairness in the cash-out merger. 99 The court concluded that the defendant
directors' "undisputed lack of care in making a market check," a flaw in the
approval process, did not preclude a finding of entire fairness.'I° The court noted
that the defendant directors:
[Hiad carefully focused on whether the . . . bid offered the best price available in a
sale of the company; had considered whether to shop the company and the risks that
course would entail; possessed a substantial amount of prior knowledge pertinent to
the decision to sell; and relied on the reports of [its chief executive officer and board
chairman], Goldman Sachs and its outside legal counsel.' 0 '
While the Delaware Supreme Court has wrestled with the duty of care, it has
left the breach of that duty a largely ineffective cause of action. In sum, the court
has stipulated that to rebut the business judgment rule's presumptions, a litigant
must show that a director was grossly negligent.'0 2 A showing of injury, however,
is not required.'03 And while directors may exhibit an "undisputed lack of care"
in executing some of their obligations, the directors can still prevail under an
entire fairness review.'0 4 Thus, a plaintiff must make a considerable showing of
gross negligence to shift the heavy burden of the business judgment rule. But
95. Id. at 370.
96. Id. at 371.
97. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
98. While this progress was certainly laudable, the court's continued reluctance to embrace the
duty of care was also evident.
99. Cede 111, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
100. Id. at 1175.
101. Id.
102. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
103. Cede 1I, 634 A.2d at 371.
104. Cede 111, 663 A.2d at 1175.
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even if the plaintiff makes such a showing, the plaintiff may still fail under an
entire fairness review.
In forging a director's standard of care, the Delaware Supreme Court has not
yet considered the effects of corporate internationalization on Delaware's citizens.
To evaluate Delaware's standard of care relative to other countries' standards,
this Comment now overviews several countries' standards of care and, where
appropriate, compares and contrasts them to Delaware's standard of care.
B. WESTERN EUROPE
1. An Overview of European Regulation
Before addressing directors' fiduciary obligations in specific European coun-
tries, this Comment overviews the regulation of corporate directors in Europe
generally.
A dual system, analogous to that existing in the United States, increasingly
regulates director conduct in Europe. 10 5 As the state of incorporation provides
the basic law governing corporations in the United States, so too is the basic law
governing European corporations that of the country of incorporation.'06
Because a jurisdiction's de facto standard of care depends on both substantive
law and procedural rules, it is very difficult to evaluate meaningfully which
jurisdiction's law sets the highest standard for corporate directors.107 Nonetheless,
the strictest substantive provisions of law in Western Europe are found in France
and Germany, followed by the United Kingdom. 0 8 The regulation of director
conduct in numerous European Community (EC) Member States, such as Spain
and Greece, however, is considerably less developed." This lack of regulation
is partially due to the fact that hostile takeovers have been rather rare until recently
in most EC countries." 10
Notwithstanding the different stages of development of European countries'
corporation and fiduciary law, legal harmonization throughout Europe appears
probable. "' However, the European Union Draft Fifth Directive and proposals for
European cooperation do not articulate a standard for skill and care for corporate
105. David J. Berger, The Second Common Market: Development of a Unified Standard for
Reviewing the Actions of Target Directors in the United States and the European Community, 9
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 1 (1991).
106. David J. Berger, Exporting the Twin Towers: The Development of a Transnational Business
Judgment Rule, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 169, 172-78 (1990); see also David J. Berger, The
European Markets Try to Coordinate, Unify Conflicting Merger Law, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1989,
at S14.
107. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 80.
108. Id. at 81.
109. Berger, supra note 106, at 1.
110. One study suggests that the first successful hostile takeover in West Germany was the Flick
Brothers' acquisition of Fedmuehle-Nobel in 1989. See Julian Franks & Golin Mayer, CapitalMarkets
and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany and the UK, 10 ECON. POL'Y 189 (1990).
111. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 81.
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directors." 2 Furthermore, recently enacted Eastern European codes closely copy
existing provisions of the European Union (EU) regulations." 3 Consequently,
the issue confronting Eastern European countries that are Member States of the
EU is whether they should passively await development of director duty of care
case law through jurisprudence, or expedite codification through directives."1
4
Accordingly, some commentators suggest that Eastern European countries should
look to U.S. duty of care case law in formulating guidelines for their own director
standard of care." 5
2. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom imposes on directors a slightly less demanding standard
of care than does Delaware. Indeed, the United Kingdom's subjective common
law duty of care" 6 has been said to "give directors a remarkable freedom to run
companies incompetently."l"' Directors in the performance of their duties need
not exhibit "a greater degree of skill and care than may reasonably be expected
from ... person[s] of [their] knowledge and experience.""' In addition, directors
are required to attend those meetings they reasonably can, but are not obligated to
give continuous attention to the affairs of the company. 119 Directors may, however,
be required to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company pursuant to
the terms of their service contracts. 1' Furthermore, directors may trust officials





116. Directors' duties of skill and care lie in nineteenth century Courts of Chancery's treatment
of directors as "trustees" or "quasi-trustees." Vanessa Finch, Company Directors: Who Cares
About Skill and Care? 55 MOD. L. REV. 179, 200 (1992). Directors' duties of care are not strictly
formed from either the common law or principles of professionalism, and the duty of care's formulation
did not heed the differences in law and practice that differentiate directors and trustees. Id. Rather,
directors were long treated as well-intentioned amateurs free from liability for anything short of
negligence. Id. However, some commentators suggest that courts may now, in light of employment
contracts, apply a higher standard to full-time executives. A.J. Boyle, Draft Fifth Directive: Implica-
tions for Directors' Duties, Board Structure and Employee Participation, 13 COMPANY LAW. No.
1, at 6 (1992).
117. Finch, supra note 116, at 179.
118. Boyle, supra note 116, at 6 (citing In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co. Ltd., 1925 Ch. 407,
428 (Eng. C.A.)). The court stated that:
A director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company of
his company [sic]. His duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical
board meetings, and at meetings of any committee of the board in which he happens
to be placed. He is not, however, bound to attend such meetings though he ought to
attend whenever in the circumstances, he is reasonably able to do so.
Id.
119. Id.; see also DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, A
COUNTRY BY COUNTRY GUIDE 204 (Alex Roney ed., 1992) [hereinafter DIRECTORS' DUTIES]; ROBERT
PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 676-78 (5th ed. 1985); Finch, supra note 116, at 179.
120. See DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 119.
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cion and the duties are allocated properly. 12' Directors may be found negligent if
they engage in dishonest behavior, fail to detect or prevent fraudulent behavior,
or carelessly misjudge business decisions. 122 Because directors are endowed with
different degrees of experience and care, the prevailing opinion is that a subjective
duty of care is the only realistic duty that can be imposed on directors.' 23 The United
Kingdom relieves negligent directors of liability where they acted" 'honestly and
reasonably' and, in all the circumstances, 'ought fairly to be excused for the negli-
gence, default, [and] breach of duty'." 24
The wrongful trading section of the United Kingdom's Insolvency Act, how-
ever, imposes a more rigorous standard of care on directors. Once directors
become aware of the approaching insolvency, their actions are judged according
to both subjective and objective criteria. 2 5 Directors must convince the court
that upon becoming aware of an approaching insolvency, they took every step
to minimize potential loss to the company. Furthermore, directors' actions and
conclusions are evaluated against those of reasonably diligent persons with the
general knowledge, skill, and experience expected of persons carrying out the
same functions as directors. 1
2 6
Therefore, the United Kingdom, like Delaware, evaluates director conduct in
fulfilling the duty of care according to a reasonable person standard. Nevertheless,
the United Kingdom evaluates director conduct from a forgiving subjective stan-
dard, in contrast to Delaware, which conducts a slightly more rigorous objective
review. The wrongful trading section of the United Kingdom's Insolvency Act,
however, more closely approaches Delaware's duty of care. United Kingdom
insolvency review, like Delaware duty of care review, involves an objective
rather than only a subjective standard. Moreover, as U.K. directors, upon becom-
ing aware of an approaching insolvency, have to minimize potential loss to the
company, so Delaware directors, in a transaction involving a sale of a company,
have to ensure that the price offered is the highest value reasonably available
under the circumstances. 1
2 7
3. Germany
Germany exacts a more testing duty of care than do the United Kingdom and
Delaware. A civil law country with laws founded upon Roman principles,'
121. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 77.
122. Boyle, supra note 116, at 6.
123. Id.
124. Finch, supra note 116, at 201.
125. DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 119.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
128. See generally NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 1 (2d ed. 1996). Although
vast differences existed between German and English legal systems at the turn of the century, these
systems are now moving closer together as a result of the increasing importance of case law in
Germany, the consolidation of statutes in the United Kingdom, and the membership of both countries
to the EC. Id.
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Germany's rigorous duty of care 29 is, in essence, an objective orderly and prudent
business manager standard. 130 More particularly, directors must apply the same
degree of care as must persons in responsible positions of authority as managers
of others' finances. 3' Thus, directors' individual abilities are not considered,
and unfitness or inexperience does not qualify as an excuse. Moreover, directors
and managers are jointly and severally liable for damages arising from their
breach of their duty of care.
132
In addition, directors and managers bear the burden to show that they have
not breached their duty of due care. 133 Under the strict German standard, any
negligence, no matter how slight, can give rise to damages. 134 Shareholders'
subsequent ratification of directors' actions will waive directors' liability if share-
holders were correctly informed. 3 However, ratification following a breach of
duty does not relieve the directors from liability. 1
36
While Germany, like Delaware, sets an objective standard of review for a
director's conduct, Germany imposes a far higher standard of care than does
Delaware. First, German directors are not protected by the business judgment
rule, but rather, bear the burden to show they did not breach their duty of care.
Delaware directors, in contrast, are guarded by the business judgment rule, which
places the initial burden on the plaintiff to show gross negligence in a duty of
care case. Furthermore, Delaware directors benefit from Delaware's judicial
reluctance to find duty of care violations. In Delaware, directors could escape
damages notwithstanding their "undisputed lack of care in making a market
check' 137 or a flaw in the approval process, while in Germany, the slightest
finding of negligence could give rise to damages. Therefore, a director's duty
129. Company law in Germany is governed by the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch), ele-
ments of the Civil Code, and statutes on distinct business forms such as the Joint Stock Corporation
Act (Aktiengesetz or AktG) and the Limited Liability Companies Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesell-
schaften mit beschriinkter Haftung). Id. at 318, 328.
130. See sections 93 and 116 of the Aktiengesellschaften [AG] [Law on Stock Corporations],
translated in Commercial Laws of West Germany, in 24 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (1990);
see also Bernard Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 14 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, BUSINESS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 4-113
(Alfred Canard ed., 1971).
131. AG, supra note 130, § 93(1).
132. Id. § 93(2).
133. See id.
134. Section 93, para. 2, of the AG stipulates the circumstances under which directors are specially
liable if they deviate from the provisions of the AG. Id. These include paying investments, interest,
or dividends to shareholders; issuing shares prior to the full payment of the nominal value or of the
higher issue value; dividing up company property; making payments after the inability to pay has
been discovered or involvement in debt has been indicated; granting credit; and issuing delivery
shares in the case of conditional increases in capital beyond the purpose established or prior to the
complete payment of equivalent value. Id. para. 3.
135. Id. para. 4.
136. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 90.
137. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1175 (Del. 1995).
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of care in Germany is not only procedurally higher than in Delaware, but also
substantively more exacting.
4. France
Like Germany, France imposes a significantly higher standard of care on
directors than does Delaware.
French corporate fiduciary law is based, in part, on French corporation struc-
tures. Companies can be managed under one of two distinct management struc-
tures: a board of directors (conseil d'administration), or an executive board
(directoire) and a supervisory board (conseil de surveillance).3 '
The duty of bons pares de famille (good fathers of families)'39 extends to
French directors. A director must refrain from taking any action contrary to the
corporation's best interests and may not foster personal interests while acting in
the corporation's name.'4° Furthermore, a director must comply with statutory
and board-imposed limitations on powers. '41 In sum, "every fault causing damage
is a source of liability." 1
42
The board of directors can, subject to the limits of the corporate purpose and
to powers expressly reserved to shareholder meetings, act in all circumstances
on behalf of the corporation.
A company president is liable for all acts of deputies and for court-imposed
duties of control and supervision over board activities of directors.143 Thus, a
company president has the considerable duty expressly to disapprove the board's
decision in order to escape joint liability.'44
France's duty of bons p&res de famille, prohibiting any action contrary to the
corporation's best interests and in a director's personal interest, again exceeds
Delaware's lenient duty of care. Furthermore, France's standard of care, lacking
Delaware's protective business judgment rule, ranks among the most exacting
standards in Western Europe.
C. JAPAN
Unlike under the French and German standards of care, shareholders probably
are better protected by the Delaware standard of care than the Japanese standard of
138. JEAN-PIERRE LE GALL & PAUL MOREL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 98-115 (2d ed. 1992).
139. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 90.
140. LE GALL & MOREL, supra note 138, at 106 (citing art. L 98 at 1).
141. Id. at 123.
142. Director liability can arise in three main areas: failure of the directors to respect statutory
law; failure to respect articles of association, notably restrictions placed on director's accounts, and
failure to deal properly with employees to ensure correct company management; and negligent,
irregular, and improper company management. CODE COMMERCIAL [C. CoM.] art. 244, 249 (Fr.),
translated in 8 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: FRANCE (1992). Furthermore, directors can also
be liable under general tort law provisions. See Breskovski, supra note 4, at 90.
143. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 90.
144. Grossfeld, supra note 130, at 4-115, 116.
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care. 145 The main source of law governing transactions in Japan is the Commercial
Code.'46 Chapter IV of the Code applies to the internal governance of stock
companies. 147 Defining the relationship between a director and the company as
one of trust (in Japanese inin, often translated as "mandate"),1 48 the Code provides
that the "trustee's (or 'mandatary's') duty is to manage the affairs entrusted to
him 'with the care of a good manager.' -149 Furthermore, the Code, in article
266-3, provides that directors in breach of their duties through "gross negligence"
or "bad faith" are jointly and severally liable for damages to third persons. 50
In addition to the duty of care, the Commercial Code stipulates explicit duties
that relate to directors' duty of care. Specifically, directors have a duty to obey
all applicable laws, ordinances, and company articles; a duty to perform their
duties faithfully on behalf of the corporation; and a duty to obtain approval of
either the directors or shareholders if conflicts of interest arise.''
However, notwithstanding the Commercial Code's clear substantive duty of
care language, shareholders in Japanese corporations do not enjoy the maximum
protection the Code offers. Specifically, Japanese administrative agencies inter-
145. See generally M. Evan Corcoran, Foreign Investment and Corporate Control in Japan:
T. Boone Pickens and Acquiring Control Through Share Ownership, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
333, 336 (1991). A shareholders' rights comparison in industrialized countries, evaluating disclosure
of corporate information, ease with which shareholders can introduce resolutions, shareholder voting
rights, shareholder notification of meetings, and shareholder proxy votes, rated Japan a feeble 48
points where the United States was the standard with 100 points. Id. at n.22 (citing S. DAVIS,
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS ABROAD: A HANDBOOK FOR THE GLOBAL INVESTOR 25 (1989)). Nonetheless,
the Japanese Commercial Code affords some rights to shareholders depending on the percentage of
shares held and the length of time that the shares have been held. See Corcoran, supra, at 339. The
most important right afforded to shareholders is the right to vote, and while different classes of stock
are permitted by the Japanese Commercial Code, virtually all stock in Japan carries voting rights.
Id.
146. SHOHO (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899 (Japan), translated in DOING BUSINESS
IN JAPAN app. 5A (Z. Kitagawa ed., 1990). The Code provides a framework for the governance of
Japanese corporations. It also covers the acquisition of Japanese companies through the purchase of
shares and controls actions by corporate directors aimed at defeating attempted takeovers. Id. arts.
210, 241(3). The Code, as originally adopted, was primarily modeled after the German Commercial
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) of 1897. HIRosHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 261 (1992). However, the Code
was amended in 1938 after the Geneva Convention and again, based on U.S. antitrust and securities
laws, in 1947 and 1950. Id. at 262. The Code underwent further major amendments in 1974, 1981,
and 1991. Id. at 262-63.
147. See generally SH5H5, supra note 146, ch. IV.
148. KENNETH L. PORT, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 341 (1996).
149. Id.; see also MINP5 (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 (Japan) art. 644, translated in EHS
LAW BULLETIN SEaIES FA 1 (1988). Article 265 requires board approval of transactions between
a director and the corporation. Id. art. 265. Further, directors must address any reasonable question
submitted in advance at a shareholders' meeting. Although foreign shareholders could thus question
corporate practices at such meetings, directors are able to evade questions by shareholders in practice.
See T. Boones Pickens, The Japan We Have to Say "No" To, HOUSTON CHRON., July 8, 1990, at
IF, 5F (explaining how Japanese management refused to answer Pickens' questions at a shareholders'
meeting).
150. PORT, supra note 148, at 341.
151. SHOH5, supra note 146, art. 254-3.
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preting and applying the Code provide only modest shareholder protection, while
Japanese courts offer few shareholder safeguards. 152
Closely tied to the substantive standard of care enunciated in the Commercial
Code and its Japanese enforcement is the way Japanese corporations operate. In
contrast to U.S. practice, a Japanese board of directors frequently exercises the
management authority that typically, in the United States, is vested in corporate
officers. 153 Furthermore, unlike the majority of their U.S. counterparts, Japanese
directors are bound to the corporation and its employees by a moral element that
may be as important as the duties imposed by the Code. 154 Larger Japanese
companies frequently guarantee lifetime employment, and directors evaluate the
consequences of corporate decisions by the welfare of the employees. 1
5
Moreover, in the context of bids for control, some commentators have sug-
gested that because directors typically are lifetime employees and rarely major
shareholders, they may subordinate the interests of shareholders to the needs of
employees. 156 In addition, Japanese directors are permitted broad discretion in
circumstances that in the United States could lead to shareholder litigation. 1
57
For instance, the Commercial Code allows directors of Japanese firms to issue
shares during a takeover attempt to dilute a would-be aquiror's stake in the
company.15 Although this tactic may present a duty of loyalty problem in the
United States, in that it damages shareholders' financial interests, diluting a
152. H. LEIGH FFRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OFTAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS: ASIA, AUSTRALIA,
AND OCEANIA 3-4 (1986) (addressing the lack of development of case law in the area of shareholders'
rights including the traditional preference for nonlitigious dispute resolution and Japan's unitary, or
nonfederal, system of governance); see also Masayoshi Kanabayashi & Marcus Brauchli, Japan
Shareholder Debate Erupts as Two Firms Join to Fend Off Suitor, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1989, at
A10.
153. While Japanese directors often exercise management control, Japanese shareholders remain
fairly silent with respect to managing Japanese companies. Kanabayashi & Brauchli, supra note
152. Specifically, the Code offers some protections similar to those of U.S. corporate law, yet the
composition of the body of shareholders in Japan makes it unlikely that shareholder proposals opposed
by management will be adopted. S. DAVIS, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS ABROAD: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
GLOBAL INVESTOR 25 (1989). This result occurs because the controlling block of stock of many
Japanese corporations is held by corporate shareholders that are often not inclined to sell shares on
the open market because of their special relationship to the company. See Corcoran, supra note 145,
at 338. As this group of related shareholders is concerned with intercompany stability and cooperation
within the group, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of these shareholders would approve the
acquisition of any company within the group. Id.
154. Corcoran, supra note 145, at 3.
155. U.S. EMBASSY IN JAPAN, UPDATE OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT AND INVESTMENT
DATA: JAPAN 13 (Feb. 24, 1988).
156. See FFRENCH, supra note 152, at 23. Stock in large Japanese firms is held in big voting
blocks with institutional investors often owning more than 20% of a firm's stock. PORT, supra note
148, at 322-23 (1996). In America, in comparison, the largest five shareholders rarely together
control 5% of a large firm's stock. Id.
157. Corcoran, supra note 145, at 322-23 (citing Toshira Nishimura, M & A Law in Japan: Rules
of the Unplayed Game, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1983).
158. See Lifting a Barrier or Two, ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 1989, at 68.
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would-be acquiror's stake may also protect the corporation from outside influ-
ence. 1
59
At first glance, the Commercial Code's substantive "good manager" standard
appears analogous to Delaware's ordinary prudent person standard. Furthermore,
Japan and Delaware have similar enforcement practices for a director's duty
of care: Japanese courts and administrative authorities do not offer extensive
shareholder protection and Delaware courts are reluctant to recognize duty of
care actions. Shareholders in a Delaware corporation, unlike shareholders in
a Japanese corporation, generally are not concerned about directors' favoring
employee interests over the corporation's interests. However, shareholders in a
Delaware corporation also do not benefit from the moral obligation directors in
a Japanese corporation have to the corporation itself.
D. EASTERN EUROPE
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia, Hungary, and
Poland recently have enacted corporate and commercial laws that closely follow
American and Western European models.160
1. Bulgaria
Bulgarian corporations are largely governed by the Bulgarian Law on Com-
merce. The Law on Commerce does not, in the context of a public limited com-
pany, contain any distinct provision delineating a director's standard of care. 16 '
Nevertheless, members of the "management board" or board of directors are
jointly liable for any "damages caused guiltily to the company."1 62 Additionally,
board members have to insure against their possible liability by depositing secu-
rity, in the form of stocks or bonds, in an amount specified at a general meeting.
This amount may not be less than the board members' remuneration for a three-
month period.' 63 However, a board member is not liable if the court concludes
that the board member has no fault connected with the damage."
Thus, while the still-developing Bulgarian Law on Commerce does not specifi-
cally address a director's duty of care, it does address a board member's "fault."
In formulating a standard of care, Bulgaria is likely to look to the United States.
65
159. Corcoran, supra note 145, at 338.
160. See Breskovski, supra note 4, at 79.
161. Id. at 93.
162. Bulgaria: Turgovski Zakon [Law on Commerce], Durzhaven Vestnik N. art. 240(1), (2)
(1991), translated in 1 CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota
ed., 1993).
163. Id. (citing art. 240(1)).
164. Id.
165. Breskovsky, supra note 4, at 81.
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2. The Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia
The Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia, like Bulgaria, are in the
process of developing their corporation laws. Corporate control in public limited
companies is vested in a three-tiered system: shareholders (specifically, through a
general assembly), a board of directors, and a supervisory or oversight council.'66
Although corporate fiduciary law is as yet only emerging, directors are bound
by a duty to exercise "appropriate care" in fulfilling their obligations. 167 Addition-
ally, directors must maintain confidentiality of information and facts if disclosure
to third parties could cause corporate harm. 168 Thus, while a duty of care exists,
corporate fiduciary law is cursory at best and, consequently, cannot effectively
be compared with Delaware.
3. Hungary
Hungarian corporate fiduciary law, also not yet well developed, nonetheless
spells out that a director "shall be obliged to act with the care generally expected
from persons in such positions." 1 69 A director that breaches this duty of care is
liable pursuant to Hungary's general civil law. 70
More specifically, directors have responsibilities that relate to the duty of care.
Such responsibilities include directing the working organization of the company,
exercising the employers' rights, and drafting balance sheets and distribution
proposals. 7 ' While directors can be jointly and severally liable, a director who
objects to a decision and reports the objection either to the supervisory board or
to the general meeting of shareholders will be relieved of liability.' 72
4. Poland
Modem Poland is a reconstruction of territories formerly under the rule of three
countries with vastly different legal systems: Austria, Russia, and Germany.' 1
73
Poland's legal system, including its corporate fiduciary law, therefore reflects
both its socialist past and its future as part of the EU. Indeed, the Association
166. Id. at 82.
167. Obchodni Zakonik [Czechoslovak Commercial Code of 1991] § 194(5), translated in 2
DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA (2d ed. 1992).
168. Id.
169. Breskovsky, supra note 4, at 94 (quoting Torveny a Gazdasagi Tarsasagokrol [Act VI of
1988 on Business Organizations], translated in 3 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE No. 3-4,
art. 32(1) (Feb. 1-15, 1992)).
170. Id.
171. KLARA OPPENHEIN & JENNY POWER, HUNGARIAN BUSINESS LAW 19 (1990).
172. See Breskovski, supra note 4, at 94 (quoting Torveny a Gazdasagi Tarsasagokrol, supra
note 169); Gyula Gayuer, Changes in Hungarian Corporate Law, DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNA-
TIONALES 526 (1990).
173. See generally Bogudar Kordawiewicz & Marek Wierzbowski, Polish Civil and Commercial
Law, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 163, 163-64 (Stanislaw Frankowski et al.
eds., 1995).
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Agreement signed in Brussels in December 1991 obligates Poland to harmonize
Polish law with EU legislation. 1
74
Poland's standard of care requires directors to execute their duties with the
"diligence of a conscientious merchant."1 75 However, it is not clear whether the
standard of review is subjective or objective. 176 Nonetheless, directors are jointly
and severally liable for breaches of their duty of care.
Polish law provides that a joint stock company governance structure consists of
the general meeting of shareholders, the management board, and the supervisory
board or audit commission. 177 The function of the members of the supervisory
board is defined as the " 'exercise of permanent (constant) supervision over
company activities encompassing all branches of the enterprise.' ,,71
A director's duties include several specific requirements related to the duty
of care. Directors must examine the balance sheet and profit-and-loss accounts,
the company's books and documents (to determine that such books and documents
are consistent with the actual condition of the company), and the management's
reports regarding profits and losses, and submit an annual report to shareholders
describing the results of these examinations. 79
E. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The development of the People's Republic of China's law, including its corpo-
rate fiduciary law, mirrors Chinese economic reforms." ° Thus, Chinese law
retains principles of its past:
Even allowing for recent developments in China that are tending to blur the rigid outlines
of the earlier Soviet economic models, it remains true that since the mid-1950's the
major sectors of the industrial and commercial economy, as well as the financial institu-
tions which serve them, have been and are dominated by state enterprises, that is,
enterprises under the ownership of the whole people.' 8'
174. The European Agreement, establishing an association between the European Communities
on the one hand and the Republic of Poland on the other, was signed in Brussels on December 16,
1996. Id. at 169 (citing DZIENNIK USTAW [Dz.U.] (Journal of Laws) No. 11, item 38 (1992)).
175. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 94.
176. Id. (quoting Decree of the President of the Republic, June 27, 1934, Dz.U. (1934) 57/502,
amended by Dz.U. (1946) 57/321, (1950) 34/312, (1964) 16/94, (1969) 13/95, (1988) 41/326,
(1990) 17/98, art. 290).
177. Id. at 84 (citing William Sievers & Andre Spark, Directors' Duties in Selected Markets:
Poland, 8 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 311 (Aug. 1993)); BIRENBAUM, supra note 167. If the
initial capital exceeds five billion zlotys (US$290,000), the corporation has to have a supervisory
board, and the latter cannot be replaced by an audit board. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 84.
178. Breskovski, supra note 4, at 84 (quoting Decree of the President of the Republic, June 27,
1934, Dz.U. (1934) 57/502, amended by Dz.U. (1946) 57/321, (1950) 34/312, (1964) 16/94, (1969)
13/95, (1988) 41/326, (1990) 17/98, art. 382).
179. Id. (citing Commercial Code of Poland, art. 382(2)).
180. KUEI-Kuo, BUSINESS LAW OF CHINA 6 (1993).
181. Id. at 8-9 (citing WENG, INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 130-34 (1987)).
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China adopted its Corporation Law in 1993, modeling it on American and
other Western corporation codes. 8 2 In so doing, China has pursued a distinct
mission to meld the organizational structure of Western capitalist business into
a political and economic regime that maintains socialist principles and goals.'83
Under Chinese law, every corporation must have a board of directors generally
elected by the shareholders for terms of up to three years.84 The board then
selects managers." 5 Chinese law also creates a "supervisory committee" that
oversees the board of directors and assures that the board pursues the policies
fixed by the shareholders. 
6
Both directors and supervisors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and are
subject to liabilities for breach. Specifically, directors and supervisors must,
analogously to American duties of loyalty, good faith, and care, fulfill their duties
"sincerely and diligently." 8 7 Furthermore, directors must obey administrative
rules and company regulations and are responsible for damages if a breach dam-
ages the corporation. 11
Although China does not expressly delineate a director standard of care, the
Corporation Law stipulates shareholder rights that may indirectly affect the degree
of care directors exercise. Granting shareholders extensive powers, the Corpora-
tion Law provides that a "shareholders' meeting is the most powerful author-
ity."-8 9 Furthermore, the Corporation Law allows the shareholder with the most
equity to call and preside over the first shareholders' meeting;' 90 permits share-
holders to elect and dismiss directors and members of the supervisory committee
and set salaries at these meetings; and empowers shareholders to inspect financial
records, to issue additional shares, and to vote on mergers, dissolutions, and
182. Robert C. Art& MinkangGu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law ofthe People's
Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 274-75 (1995). The primary purposes of the law are:
to restructure state-owned enterprises' organization and management; to combat inefficiency; to
lessen the state's role in managing business; and to stimulate competition. The state will, however,
maintain ultimate control and majority ownership of the largest enterprises. Id. at 275 (citing Wu
Naitao, Guarantee for Modem Enterprise System, BEIJING REV., Apr. 4-5, 1994, at 14).
183. A process of "corporatization" rather than "privatization," China's Corporation Law
restructures state enterprises, adopts the corporate form, and institutes stock ownership and trade,
but does not give up the state's enterprises and does not forgo the state's ultimate control of production
means. Id. at 275.
184. Art & Gu, supra note 182, at 295 (citing Corporation Law art. 115).
185. Id. (citing Corporation Law art. 45).
186. Members of the supervisory committee attend board meetings in a nonvoting capacity, inspect
the company's financial affairs, and have the responsibility to prevent the board of directors and
company managers from violating regulations and company bylaws. See id. at 296 (citing Corporation
Law arts. 54, 126).
187. Id. (citing Corporation Law art. 128).
188. Id. (citing Corporation Law arts. 63, 128).
189. Id. (citing Corporation Law art. 128).
190. However, shareholders, directors, or supervisors may call special meetings. Id. (citing Corpo-
ration Law art. 42).
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liquidations.' 91 Chinese shareholders have the right to sue for an injunction and
damages if a decision of the board "violates laws and administrative rules, and
invades the legal interests of the shareholders."192 In addition, shareholders "con-
sider[] and approv[e] the plan of distribution of profits and recovery for losses."
93
In contrast, American corporate law places those decisions exclusively within
the scope of the directors' authority.'94
Thus, while the Corporation Law does not specifically address a director's
duty of care, it still offers shareholders extensive protection through a wide accord
of power.195 In doing so, China's Corporation Law primarily is not oriented to
entrepreneurial, capitalist business but rather is designed to restructure state-
owned enterprises and private business interests of lesser importance.
96
F. CANADA
Canadian corporation statutes, traceable to the new Ontario Business Corpora-
tions Act that was adopted in 1970, draw heavily on U.S. statutory patterns.
197
Canada has, in addition to provincial competition statutes, 198 a federal corpora-
tions statute, the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA).'99
Canada is known for highly concentrated share ownership and for the predomi-
nant position of a small number of family-based groups as share owners.200 Conse-
quently, a substantially larger number of Canadian companies with public equity
191. Id. While Chinese board procedures and powers are somewhat analogous to those in American
corporate practice, the Corporation Law specifies the number of directors, limits director terms to
three years, and allows directors not attending a meeting to vote by proxy. Id. (citing Corporation
Law arts. 112, 115, 118). American corporation laws, on the other hand, generally set no standards
on the number of directors, limit terms to one year in most cases, and do not allow directors to vote
by proxy. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.03, 8.05, 8.20 (1991).
192. Art & Gu, supra note 182, at 295 (citing Corporation Law art. 111).
193. Id. (citing Corporation Law art. 38) (alterations in original).
194. REV. MODEL Bus. CoRn'. ACT § 8.01(b) (1994) states the general rule that "[alil corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors ......
195. The Corporation Law defines the powers of shareholders broadly so the government may
exercise its ultimate powers over enterprises through stock ownership. The law protects workers
and investors through safeguards such as administrative sanctions for managers' breaches of duty
as a substitute for the derivative actions used in corporate law outside China. Art & Gu, supra note
182, at 297.
196. Id.
197. See JACOB S. ZIEGEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSHIPS AND CANADIAN
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 99 (2d ed. 1989).
198. In addition, securities regulation is a provincial matter in Canada. Deborah A. DeMott,
Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment of Canadian Remedies for Minority Share-
holders and Other Corporate Constituents, 56-WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 181 n.2 (1993).
199. Id.
200. Family dynasties significantly impact the destinies of Canadian corporations. See, e.g.,
Deborah A. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 74
(1987) ("In 1985,. . nine families were reported to control forty-six percent of the top 300 companies
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange."). Further, over 60% of the 300 large, publicly traded
companies included in the Toronto Stock Exchange index have a shareholder or coalition of associated
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investors also have controlling shareholders. As a result, more occasions for
inter-shareholder conflict arise.
Canadian law differs from U.S. law in a number of significant respects. Specifi-
cally, under Canadian law a majority shareholder is not a fiduciary toward the
minority, and Canadian statutes expressly protect the interest of a large cast
of nonshareholder constituents, who may enforce their rights through private
litigation.20' In Brant Investments, the Ontario Court of Appeals held that other
components of Canadian law made it unnecessary and even "inappropriate"
to impose a fiduciary obligation in favor of minority shareholders on majority
shareholders or, for that matter, on directors.2 2 The court relied upon the breadth
and generality of the remedy for oppression created by the CBCA.2 °3
The origins of Canadian oppression remedies are readily traceable to provisions
in the English companies acts.' °4 Canadian statutory language, however, clearly
expands the grievances beyond the "oppressive" acts and omissions covered by
the initial English provisions. The CBCA encompasses the corporation's acts
and omissions, the conduct of its business, and the exercise of its directors'
powers. A complainant may seek relief based on corporate acts and omissions
that are " 'unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregard[] the interests of any
security holder, creditor, director or officer......205
Therefore, the choice of framework under which corporate behavior is evalu-
ated and defined by either U.S. fiduciary concepts or Canadian oppression statutes
matters greatly.2" 6 Canadian oppression statutes reflect different assumptions re-
garding the primacy of shareholders' interests and about the significance of prior
contractual definitions for other constituents' expectations and interests.2 7 Op-
pression jurisprudence generally leads to fewer and duller lines of demarcation
than does analysis using contractual or fiduciary norms.2°s
The relative conservatism of Canadian judges and the lingering influence of
English law explain why Canadian courts have not followed the lead of their
shareholders with legal control, while only 14% of the index's companies are widely held. See Ronald
J. Daniels & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime, 29
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 863, 884 (1992).
201. Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc., 80 D.L.R.4th 161 (Ont. App. 1991).
202. Id. at 171, 172.
203. Id. Statutory oppression remedies and fiduciary doctrines operate fairly generally. Brian
Cheffins, The Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 305, 321-22 (1988). Moreover, as the operative concepts of oppression and fiduciary duty
are not precise, these doctrines do not operate with a high level of predictability. Further, because
of the oppression statutes' generality, it is difficult to discern, in analytic form, the constituent
elements of conduct that violate the statute. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Bad Faith and the Oppression Remedy: Uneasy Marriage, or
Amicable Divorce? 69 CAN. Bus. REV. 276, 279 (1990).
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counterparts in the United States in imposing a fiduciary obligation on majority
shareholders. The characteristics of judges, however, do not explain the distinc-
tive legislative contribution to corporate law made by the Canadian oppression
statutes. The Canadian system has been said to reflect a dominant value of egalitar-
ianism. 209 For example, the regulation of corporate takeovers in Ontario and
Quebec mandates equal treatment of target shareholders to a far larger degree
than the same regulation in the United States. 2'0 Further, the Canadian resolution
seems to disfavor clearly drawn demarcations that differentiate among interests
created by the varied relationships that creditors, shareholders, and other parties
have to a corporation. 2"
III. Conclusion
While the world's securities markets increasingly are internationalized and as
countries look to the United States in formulating corporation laws, Delaware's
duty of care remains largely impotent. A showing of "gross negligence" that
is required to overcome the business judgment rule's presumption is very difficult
to meet, as evidenced by the few duty of care decisions in Delaware. Furthermore,
a director can show the entire fairness of a transaction even where the court
found the director guilty of an "undisputed lack of care" in fulfilling some
duties.212 Consequently, the Delaware duty of care has been said to have very
little effect on corporate governance.2"3
As Delaware's duty of care sluggishly evolves, other countries' fiduciary laws
are at various stages of development. Western Europe's well-developed standard
of care ranges from the United Kingdom's subjective "reasonably diligent per-
son" standard, 1 4 and Germany's more rigorous orderly prudent business manager
standard under which directors bear the burden to show that they did not breach
their duties of care,215 to France's bons pares de famille standard under which
directors must expressly disapprove of board actions to escape joint liability. 2' 6
Japan offers far less shareholder protection through its court system, administra-
209. Id.
210. Indeed, the Ontario Securities Act, subject to a few exceptions, defines any transaction in
which a person acquires 20% or more of a class of shares as a takeover bid, which must be made
at the same price to all holders in the same class. Id. Further, the Ontario Securities Act defines
corporate control to be an asset of the corporation. Id. The protectable interests of shareholders are
similarly equated with those of nonshareholder constituents. Id. Canadian oppression statutes mini-
mize the special status of equity investment. This framework makes it difficult for courts to attach
explicit fiduciary constraints to any particular relationship created by the corporate form of organiza-
tion. Id.
211. Id. at 20.
212. Cede III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1175 (Del. 1995).
213. Id.; see Horsey, supra note 12, at 977-80; Chittur, supra note 69, at 505; Cohn, supra note
69, at 593.
214. See supra part II.A.
215. See supra part II.B.2.
216. See supra part II.B.3.
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tive agencies, and Commercial Code.217 Recently enacted Eastern Europe codes
remain largely obscure in searching for a more developed standard of care.2"'
Chinese corporate laws, continuously evolving with the country's economy, cur-
rently impose a strict duty on directors to fulfill their duties "sincerely and
diligently.' 21 9 Finally, Canada, drawing upon oppression remedies, offers less
clear lines of demarcation than even U.S. fiduciary laws.22°
While the world's fiduciary laws are transforming, U.S. investors (and Dela-
ware citizens) are investing in corporations worldwide. U.S. (and Delaware)
corporations increasingly are bound by foreign countries' standards of care. The
result is that Delaware citizens frequently encounter the greater risks of director
misconduct, such as corporate corruption, that arise in developing countries.2 '
While Delaware's physical boundaries cease in the United States, its citizens'
interests are tied into corporations internationally. Furthermore, countries devel-
oping their commercial codes are encouraged to look to the United States in
refining their standards of care.222
Thus, compelling reasons exist for Delaware to reassess its standard of care
in light of corporate internationalization. Not only should Delaware lead the
developing world by establishing a more meaningful standard of care, it should
protect its citizens doing business abroad. Consequently, Delaware should require
directors, prior to invoking the business judgment rule, to make a showing of
subjective good faith and due care. 223 Alternatively, Delaware should require a
showing of ordinary negligence, as opposed to gross negligence, to overcome
the business judgment rule's presumptions.2 24 In the final analysis, regardless of
how Delaware ultimately formulates its standard of care, its need to look beyond
the United States in so doing is fundamental.
217. See supra part II.B.4.
218. See supra part U.C.
219. See supra part H.D.
220. See supra part I.E.
221. The opportunity for corporate corruption may be greater in developing than in developed
countries. See, e.g., Horsey, supra note 12, at 1961 ("[t]he risk of looting is far higher in emerging
than in developed markets."); John Hogarth, Bribery of Official in Pursuit of Corporate Aims, 6
CiuM. L. FORUM 557 (1995) (noting corruption in developing countries such as Russia).
222. See Breskovski, supra note 4, at 80.
223. For a similar analysis, see Dent, supra note 70, at 644-45.
224. Directors will still have the business judgment rule's presumptions. But a plaintiff will be
able to rebut the rule's presumption of good faith and due care more effectively.
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